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Urban sprawl has become a major policy issue in the U.S. in recent years. Sprawl critics
argue that the spatial growth of cities has been excessive, consuming inordinate amounts of
farmland and other open space while generating long commutes, tra±c congestion and ex-
tra pollution. Public policy has responded to these concerns, with many states and localities
adopting measures to curb the spatial growth of cities. Oregon, New Jersey, Maryland, Ten-
nessee and a number of other states have adopted explicit anti-sprawl ordinances. Over 240
sprawl measures appeared on 1998 election ballots nationwide, and many were approved by
the voters. Among existing measures, perhaps the best known is Portland's \urban growth
boundary," which prohibits development outside a speci¯ed ring drawn around the city.
Urban economists have long understood that several fundamental forces drive the spatial
growth of cities. These forcesinclude the growth in household income (which raises the demand
forliving space), the reduction in commuting costsdue to transportimprovements (which eases
suburban access), and rising city populations. With each of these forces strongly evident in
American cities, their spatial growth over recent decades comes as no surprise. But while
growth in response to such fundamental forces cannot be faulted on e±ciency grounds, market
failures or other distortions might bias the growth process in an upward direction, causing
cities to expand too much.
Several such factors have been identi¯ed as potential culprits. The ¯rst, a market failure,
arises because developers fail to account for the amenity value of the open space surrounding
cities in their development decisions. The second distortion arises through the system of local
public ¯nance, which often fails to charge developers for the full cost of the infrastructure
(sewers, parks, roads, etc.) necessitated by their developments. Both of these failures make
development look arti¯cially cheap, thus encouraging its occurrence.
1The property tax, which may cause cities to expand by reducing the intensity of land
development, is another culprit, as is the tax subsidy to homeownership, which raises the
demand for space by owner-occupiers. Finally, the market failure associated with unpriced
road congestion is a likely contributor to overexpansion of cities. Because of the congestion
externality, the perceived cost of commute travel is less than its social cost, which leads to
overly-long commute trips and cities that are too spread out.1
The present paper focuses on a closely-related issue: the e®ect of transport subsidies on
the spatial expansion of cities. In the U.S., road networks as well as public-transit systems are
subsidized, with revenuesfrom userfees fallingwell shortof the combined operatingand capital
costs of the systems. Such subsidies, which are common in other countries as well, reduce the
cost of travel within cities, potentially encouraging their spatial expansion. This conclusion
is not immediate, however, because transport subsidies must be supported by general tax
revenue. As a result, while a subsidy reduces the direct cost of using the transport system, it
raises the general tax burden, reducing disposable incomes. The ¯rst e®ect causes a city to
expand, while the second (by reducing the demand for space) causes it to contract. The net
e®ect is not clear a priori, and one purpose of the analysis in the paper is to determine its sign.
The discussion establishes that the sign is indeed positive: transport subsidies contribute to
the spatial expansion of cities. To provide a simple analysis, this result is demonstrated in a
model where road congestion is absent.
Whetheror not the spatial expansion due to subsidies is ine±cient depends crucially on the
nature of the transportation technology. The analysis in the paper assumes that the transport
system exhibits constant returns to scale, with total costs proportional to total passenger
miles. In this case, transport subsidies are ine±cient, which implies that the resulting spatial
growth of the city represents undesirable overexpansion. If, on the other hand, the transport
technology exhibits increasing returns, then subsidies are warranted, and their e®ects on city
size cannot be viewed as undesirable. In attempt to determine which view is appropriate,
the discussion reviews empirical work on returns to scale in transportation, noting that some
of the evidence points to increasing returns. But the discussion concludes by arguing that,
from one perspective, transport systems necessarily exhibit constant returns, making subsidies
2undesirable and their city-expanding e®ects ine±cient. Note that this ine±ciency compounds
the e®ects of unpriced road congestion, which is omitted from the model. Thus, transport
subsidies may amplify the e®ect of unpriced congestion in producing undesirable urban sprawl.
While the analysis just described treats the transport system as given, the discussion in
section 3 analyzes \system choice." The city is portrayed as selecting its transport system from
along a continuum of money-cost/time-cost choices. A road network has a high money cost,
which includes the cost of automobile operation, but a low time cost, while a slow but resource-
e±cient public-transit system has the opposite characteristics. The analysis ¯rst investigates
the e®ect of transport subsidies on system choice, showing that subsidies ine±ciently bias
choice in the direction of a high-money-cost/low-time-cost option. This conclusion provides
support for the common allegation that U.S. cities have overinvested in freeways atthe expense
of public transit, with the culprit being money-cost subsidies. The analysis shows that adding
a system-choice dimension to the model leaves the previous conclusions about subsidies and
urban sprawl una®ected.
The last part of the analysis considers system choice in a city where subsidies are absent
but the transport system serves two distinct income groups. It is shown that the rich group
favors a high-money-cost/low-time-cost option, but that their choice, if implemented, leads
to a city whose spatial size is smaller than optimal. Thus, if the rich group is able to skew
investment decisions toward freeways and away from public transit, the result is not spatial
overexpansion of the city, as some observers might argue. The reason is that the resulting
transport system is wrong from the point of view of the poor, which depresses their demand
for space, retarding the city's spatial expansion.
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is useful to gain a sense of the magnitude of the
transport subsidies present in the U.S. and Europe. In the case of public transit, data on 6,000
public-transit agencies compiled by the American Public Transit Association show that total
fares collected in 2001, which amounted to $8.89 billion, covered only 38% of total system
operating costs and 25% of combined operating and capital costs.2 For highways, Federal
Highway Administration data show that user fees, including gasoline taxes, license fees and
related charges, accounted for 60% of highway disbursements, which include both capital and
3maintenance expenditures (disbursements were $129.9 billion in 2001).3
Although such aggregate data are not readily available forEurope, information provided by
the Transportation Research Board (2001) shows that public-transit fares account for a higher
proportion of operating costs than in the U.S. Figure 2-4 in this publication, which shows
subsidy rates for individual European transit systems, indicates that fares cover on average
about50% of operating costs. While no aggregate highway data are available, the dramatically
higher level of gasoline taxes in Europe (see Pucher (1988)) suggests that user fees more than
cover the cost of European roads.
2. Subsidies and Urban Sprawl
2.1. Key assumptions of the analysis
As just noted, both public-transit systems and highways are subsidized in the U.S. The
goal of the analysis in this section is to explore the e®ect of these subsidies on the spatial sizes
of cities, abstracting from the question of system choice. As a result, the analysis assumes that
the city relies on a particular type of transportation system, which is unrealistically assumed
to carry all tra±c. The system might consist solely of a road network, with the city o®ering no
public-transit option. Or the city might rely entirely on a bus or rail system to transport its
residents, with automobile travel ruled out. This stylized view, which unrealistically eliminates
the mode-choice decision faced by real-world commuters, is adopted in order to generate a
simple and clearcut analysis. Presumably, the lessons of the analysis would generalize to
a more realistic model where several di®erent transport options are available to the city's
residents.
Travel in the city consistssolely of commute trips, with all workerscommutingtojobsatthe
employmentcenter (CBD), incurring both time and money costs. Asnoted in the introduction,
transport congestion is absent. Although the most general approach to generating time costs
relies on a model with a labor-leisure choice, the resulting complexity limits the usefulness
of such an approach. Instead, the present analysis relies on a convenient assumption that
generates time costs in a tractable fashion while still capturing the spirit of a more general
model. In particular, the analysis assumes that, rather than reducing the hours available for
4both work and leisure, commutinginstead reducesonly work hours. Thus, an extra commuting
hour robs the worker of an hour of work time, lowering income by the wage per hour.
Accordingly, let y denote \full income," which represents the CBD income earned per
period by a worker with a zero commute time. Then, let x denote distance from a worker's
residence to the CBD, and let µ denote the fraction of the available work hours consumed
by each round-trip mile of commuting. The parameter µ is an inverse measure of the speed
of travel allowed by the transport system. Pre-tax income for a worker living at distance x
then equals y ¡ µyx ´ y ¡¿x, where ¿ ´ µy is the time cost per mile of commuting. These
time costs do not play a central role in the analysis presented in this section of the paper, but
instead enter crucially in the discussion of system choice in section 3.
The money cost of commuting from distance x is given by kx, making total commuting
cost equal to (¿ + k)x. In practice, these money costs embody subsidies, which are the focus
of the present analysis. For example, in the case of transit riders, fares cover only a portion
of operating and capital costs. For automobile commuters, gasoline taxes and other user fees
cover only a portion of the costs of building and operating a road network.
To gauge the extent of the subsidy embodied in k, the full cost of transportation must be
speci¯ed. The analysis will proceed under a strong and potentially controversial assumption
regarding these costs. In particular, the full money cost of transportation incurred within the
city is assumed to be proportional to total passenger miles of travel, indicating constant returns
to scale. Thus, letting t denote the constant of proportionality, the full money cost for an indi-
vidual living at distance x equals tx (t times individual passenger miles), and the total money
cost of transportation in the city is found by appropriately aggregating this expression across
all residential locations. In the presence of a subsidy, the money cost k paid by commuters is
some fraction ® of the full cost, with k = ®t. Thus, while the full money cost of commuting
is tx for a worker living at x, the worker pays only ®tx. The di®erence, (1 ¡ ®)tx, must be
covered by general tax revenue.
For public-transit users, ® represents the percentage of operating and capital costs covered
by fares (which are implicitly proportional to distance traveled under the present formulation).
For automobile commuters, by contrast, full transport costs represent a combination of the
5private cost of vehicle operation and the cost of road construction and maintenance. Because
the user fees paid by drivers cover only a portion of these latter road costs, a particular
® < 1 again emerges. Recall, however, that only one of these transport modes is available to
commuters in the stylized model under consideration.
The above proportionality assumption is controversial because, with total costs propor-
tional to passenger miles, the transport technology exhibits constant returns to scale, even
though some empirical evidence points to the existence of increasing returns. Nevertheless,
the analysis will proceed to evaluate both the desirability and the e®ect of existing transport
subsidies under the constant-returns assumption. Once the analysis is complete, the discus-
sion considers how the conclusions would change under increasing returns, while appraising
the defensibility of the constant-returns assumption.
2.2. Urban spatial model
To explore the e®ect of transport subsidies on the spatial equilibrium of the city, this
section develops a spatial model, relying on the above assumptions on commuting costs. The
model represents a standard application of the monocentric-city framework, as presented by
Wheaton (1974) and others.
Without loss of generality, the city is assumed to be linear with unit width. In e®ect, the
city occupies a rectangular island, and for simplicity, the CBD is assumed to be located at one
end. Rental income from the urban land accrues to absentee landowners, who live outside the
city.
City residents consume land, denoted q, and a numeraire nonland good, denoted c. With-
out loss of generality, housing capital is suppressed, with land itself representing the housing
commodity. With land rent denoted r, the budget constraint for a consumer living at distance
x is c + rq = y ¡ T ¡ (¿ + ®t)x, where T is a head tax levied on all urban residents. This
tax covers the subsidy-induced de¯cit in the operation of the transport system. The consumer
chooses c and q to maximize the utility function v(c; q) subjectto this constraint, and r adjusts
so that the realized utility level is uniform across locations. The two conditions vq=vc = r and
v(y ¡T ¡(¿ + ®t)x ¡ rq; q) = u must then be satis¯ed, where u is the uniform utility level.
These conditions determine r and q as functions of the parameters in the equations, with the
6solutions written r(y¡T; ¿ +®t; x; u) and q(y¡T;¿ +®t; x; u). Note that the relevant income
and commuting cost parameters are full net-of-tax income, y¡T, and the combined time and
money cost per mile of commuting, ¿ +®t.
The urban equilibrium conditions impose three requirements, two of which are standard.
First, urban land rent at x, the edge of the city, must equal the agricultural rent, ra. Second,
the city population n must ¯t inside x. These conditions are written




q(y ¡T;¿ +®t; x;u)
dx = n: (2)
Note that since 1=q in (2) is population density, and since the city is linear with unit width,
the integral aggregates the population out to x and equates it to n.
The third condition is a balanced-budget condition stating that the transport de¯cit is just
covered by revenue from the head tax. This condition is written




q(y¡T; ¿ + ®t; x; u)
dx (3)
Note that the integral in (3) is total money commuting cost in the city (money cost at distance
x times population density 1=q, aggregated over the city). Since only a fraction ® of this cost
is paid by commuters, the remaining share must be covered by the head tax. It is convenient
to rewrite (3) and (4) as the two separate conditions







q(y¡T; ¿ + ®t; x; u)
dx (5)
where e x is the average commuting distance in the city. Eq. (4) thus indicates that T must
equal the subsidized portion of average money commuting costs.
Equations (1), (2), (4) and (5) constitute four conditions that solve for the unknowns u, x,
T and e x. For the purposes of the ensuing analysis, however, it is helpful to view this solution
7as occurring recursively. First, (1) and (2) are solved to yield solutions for u and x conditional
on T, which may be written
u = F(y¡T; ¿ + ®t) (6)
x = G(y¡T; ¿ + ®t) (7)
(the solutions' dependence on n and ra is suppressed). These solutions are substituted into (4)
and (5), which then determine T and e x as functions of the underlying parameters y, ¿, t and ®,
with the latter subsidy parameter being the one of interest. Finally, the resulting T solution is
substituted back into (6) and (7), which then determine u and x as functions of the underlying
parameters. The advantage of this approach is that the signs of the derivatives of the F and G
functions are known from the standard comparative-static analysis of the monocentric city, as
presented by Wheaton (1974). The following discussion relies, in particular, on the inequalities
G1 > 0 and G2 < 0, which show that x rises with an increase in income and falls with an
increase in commuting cost per mile. As seen below, this information can be exploited to show
the e®ect of the transport subsidy on the spatial equilibrium of the city.
2.3. The e®ect of the transport subsidy
With the above preparation, it is possible to appraise the e®ect of the transport subsidy
on the urban equilibrium. Two issues are of interest. First, is the subsidy ine±cient? Second,
what is the subsidy's e®ect on the city's spatial size, as represented by x? If the answer to the
¯rst question is a±rmative, while the second answer shows that the subsidy raises x, then the
analysis will have established that transport subsidies contribute to undesirable urban sprawl.
The e±ciency question can be answered easily by appealingtothe standard welfare analysis
for a monocentric city. A social planner chooses the spatial pattern of land consumption in
the city to minimize resource usage subject to a ¯xed utility requirement for the residents.
Resource usage is equal to the sum of total nonland consumption, total commuting cost, and
the opportunity cost of the urban land. The optimality conditions for this problem are the
same as the equilibrium conditions (1) and (2), modi¯ed so that ® = 1 and T = 0 hold and
y is set at a level consistent with the target utility (see, for example, Fujita (1989, Ch. 3)).
8Thus, since the optimality conditions require urban residents to face the full money cost t of
commuting at each location, equilibrium in the presence of a transport subsidy is ine±cient.
Total resource usage in the city could be reduced, while maintaining the equilibrium utility
level, if the subsidy were removed. This ine±ciency result recapitulateswell-known conclusions
regarding subsidiesand returns toscale, providing an illustration of these results in the context
of an urban spatial model.
With the ¯rst question above answered, consider now the e®ect of the transport subsidy on
x. To do so, let @x=@® and @e x=@® denote the e®ects of ® on x and e x from the full solution to
(1), (2), (4) and (5). Unfortunately, given the complexity of this equation system, the general
signsof these derivatives cannot be established. However, a more limited result can be derived,











The key observation is that, while both derivatives in (8) are generally ambiguous in sign, the
sign of @x=@® is determinate for ® = 1. In this case, the @e x=@® derivative drops out of (8),
and @x=@® has the same sign as G1e x+G2. While the sign of this expression is not immediately
apparent given G1 > 0 and G2 < 0, the appendix shows that the sign is negative. As a result,
starting in the no-sudsidy case, where ® = 1, the introduction of a small transport sudsidy (a
marginal reduction in ®) leads to an increase in x.
Intuitively, a decrease in ® (an increase in the subsidy) has two opposing e®ects. By
lowering commuting cost per mile, the higher subsidy tends to increase x, causing the city to
spread out. However, a higher subsidy requires an increase in the head tax T, which tends
to reduce x by lowering net-of-tax income for the city residents. The relation between the
magnitudes of these opposing e®ects is determined via the budget-balance condition (3), and
this condition implies that the ¯rst e®ect dominates the second.4
It should be noted that this dominance appears to hinge on the fact that the net burden
on the edge resident, who lives at x, falls as the subsidy rises. Because of his long commute,
this resident enjoys the highest absolute subsidy in the city but pays a head tax that recovers
9only the average amount of the subsidy. The edge resident's disposable income thus increases
as ® falls, suggesting that his willingness to pay for land should rise. Higher land rent at x in
turn implies an expansion of the city.
This discussion can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1. Suppose that the transport system exhibits constant returns to scale,
with total costs proportional to total passenger miles. Then, imposition of a transport
subsidy is ine±cient, reducing social welfare. In addition, starting from the no-subsidy
case, introduction of a small subsidy leads to an increase in x. Thus, transportsubsidies
tend to be associated with ine±cient urban sprawl.
It should be noted the sign of @u=@® is ambiguous, indicating that the utility of the city's
residents can either rise or fall as the transport subsidy is increased. This conclusion is not
inconsistent with the overall ine±ciency of the subsidy, a verdict that takes into account the
welfare of both consumers and absentee landlords.
While a general \global" analysis of the e®ect of subsidies is not feasible, accounting for
the local result (where ® = 1) in Proposition 1, such an analysis could proceed by imposing
particular functional forms on preferences. For example, in the case of Leontief preferences, it
is easily shown that Proposition holds globally, for arbitrary ®. In the case of other familiar
preferences such as Cobb-Douglas, numerical analysis of the equilibrium conditions would be
required to derive a conclusion. Such a task could be a subject for further work.
Another extension would be to assume that the subsidy is ¯nanced with funds collected
via an income tax rather than the head tax T. Recognizing that time cost causes income to
fall as x increases, the two taxes are not equivalent in the present setting.
2.4. Appraising the constant-returns assumption
The ine±ciency of subsidies hinges crucially on the assumption that the transport system
exhibits constant returns to scale. Although there are many ways of modeling non-constant
returns, this point can be simply demonstrated using one plausible speci¯cation that embodies
a form of increasing returns. In particular, suppose that total transport costs have two com-
ponents. The ¯rst, a \variable-cost" component, is proportional to total passenger miles, as
above, while the second is a ¯xed cost that depends only on the spatial extent of the transport
10system. In the current model, suppose that this ¯xed cost equals sx, capturing the notion that
the distance x to the edge of the city also equals the \length" of the transport network.
Although a closed-form relationship between total transport costs and passenger miles
cannot be derived in general for this modi¯ed model, such a derivation is possible if land
consumption in the city is constant. If q is constant (taking the value unity for simplicity),
then total passenger miles equals
R x





2m, which increases less than proportionally with m, indicating increasing
returns.
Under this new speci¯cation, the optimality conditions for the city are again modi¯ed
versions of (1) and (2). As before, ® is set equal to unity and T is set equal to zero. In
addition, ra on the RHS of (1) is replaced by ra + s. The explanation is that, in addition to
foregoing agricultural rent when a unit of land is converted to urban use, the transport system
must also be extended at cost s. At the optimal x, these losses are equated to the gain from
urban development, as measured by urban rent.
Thus, to generate the optimum, commuters should face the full variable cost of transporta-
tion, with ® = 1. However, the ¯xed cost of the transport system should be recovered through
a lump sum charge that is unrelated to system use. For example, one way to support the
optimum would be to charge absentee landowners a development tax of s per acre of land to
recover the ¯xed cost of the transport system. With such a tax, the net return from urban
land is r ¡s, and the city expands until this net-of-tax return is equated to ra, satisfying the
new optimality condition. Thus, within this simple framework, user fees should only cover the
variable cost of the transport system, so that system use is e®ectively subsidized. But this
outcome is now e±cient rather than undesirable. A similar conclusion would emerge under
other speci¯cations that involve increasing returns.
Whether existing transport subsidies are ine±cient, leading to an undesirable spatial ex-
pansion of cities, therefore depends on whether constant or increasing returns characterizes
real-world transportation systems. Empirical evidence on returns to scale for urban bus and
rail systems is surveyed by Small (1992), and he argues that the evidence demonstrates in-
creasing returns when output is measured by passenger miles or a related construct. However,
11Small states that this e®ect arises \presumably because vehicles can be used more intensively
as demand grows." Small (1992) also surveys the evidence on returns to scale in road net-
works, although the relevant studies focus purely on construction costs as a function of road
capacity, without considering output measures such as passenger miles. According to Small,
the evidence is consistent with \mild" increasing returns when road capacity is viewed as the
output measure.
Despite this evidence, one could argue that transport systems should in principle exhibit
approximate constant returns to scale. To see the argument, recall Small's view that the esti-
mated increasing returns in rail and bus systems may be due to the existence of underutilized
vehicle capacity. In this situation, passenger miles can be increased with little cost by simply
¯lling half-empty buses and rail cars with additional riders. But this possibility suggests that
the original capacity of the system was too large. If system capacity is instead adjusted to
match demand, then costs should increase roughly in step with passenger miles. Adding a
passenger mile would mean adding a seat mile, which would involve a constant additional cost.
A similarargument mightapply in the case of highways. If highways were builttomaintain
a uniform tra±c density throughout the network, then adding a passenger mile would require
adding some fraction of a lane mile, again at an approximately constant cost. Including road
maintenance costs and automobile operating costs, which presumably vary in close proportion
to passenger miles, the case for overall constant returns is strengthened. As with bus and
rail systems, this argument hinges on keeping capacity utilization constant as passenger miles
expands.
Thus, despite some empirical evidence of increasing returns in transport systems, intro-
spection might suggestthatreturns to scale, when properly measured, should be approximately
constant. If this view is correct, then the negative e±ciency verdict on subsidies contained in
Proposition 1 may be realistic. The countervailing evidence, however, must make any conclu-
sion tentative.5
123. System Choice
3.1. The e®ect of subsidies on system choice
The analysis in the Section 2 assumed that the city was served by a given type of transport
system, as characterized by particular values of ¿ and t, the time and money-cost parameters.
A road network, for example, would entail a high t (capturing both road and automobile costs)
and a relatively low ¿, re°ecting the speed and convenience of auto travel. Relative to a road
network, a rail or bus system would involve a lower t and a higher ¿, re°ecting lower resource
usage per passenger and higher time costs.6
Although no city relies exclusively on one type of transportsystem, contrary to the stylized
assumption used in the analysis, cities do favor particular transport modes. Some cities invest
heavily in public-transit systems, which may then account for an appreciable share of tra±c,
while others rely almost entirely on road networks to transport their residents. City choices
thus a®ect the t and ¿ parameters that govern transport costs.
To investigate this question of system choice within the context of the present model,
suppose that the discreteness of existing transport options is ignored. Instead, suppose that
the city is portrayed as choosing its single transport system from among a continuum of
possibilities, with the continuum capturing the trade-o® between time and money costs. To
capture this trade-o®, recall that time cost parameter ¿ equals µy, where µ, the fraction of
work hours consumed by each round-trip mile of commuting, is an inverse measure of travel
speed. The given trade-o® can then be represented by the function µ = Á(t), which relates the
transport system's travel speed to its money cost. The function Á satis¯es Á0 < 0, indicating
that higher money costs are associated with lower time costs (higher speed), as in the above
discussion of roads vs. rail or bus systems. Substituting Á, the ¿ parameter can then be
rewritten as yÁ(t).
System choice involves selecting a particular (t;¿) pair from along the available continuum.
Consider ¯rst the outcome of thischoice in a city withouta transportsubsidy. The equilibrium
in such a city is characterized by (1) and (2) with ® = 1 and T = 0, which yield the equilibrium
solutionsforu and x given by (6)and (7), again with ® = 1and T = 0. Assumingthatthe city's
transport system is chosen through a democratic process to serve the interests of its residents,
13the choice then maximizes the equilibrium utility level in (6). Since standard analysis shows
that F2 < 0, indicating that utility is decreasing in commuting costs, the goal is to choose t to
minimize ¿ + t = yÁ(t)+t. The ¯rst-order condition for this choice is
yÁ0(t)+ 1 = 0; (9)
and the second-order condition for a minimum is Á00 > 0, indicating that time cost falls at
a decreasing rate as money cost rises. Note that since G2 < 0, the transport system that
minimizes ¿ +t leads to the largest spatial size for the city among all possible systems. Finally,
it is easy to see that condition (9) also characterizes the socially optimal system, where the
interests of absentee landowners are considered along with those of city residents.
Now consider the system-choice problem for a city with a transport subsidy, where ® < 1
and T > 0. In order to provide a simple characterization of this choice, it is useful to impose
a plausible myopia assumption. In particular, suppose that city residents do not understand
the connection between system choice and their general tax burden, as re°ected in the head
tax T that covers the transport de¯cit. Thus, the city residents choose the transport system
focusing on the transport costs that they face directly. This assumption is likely to be an
accurate description of the public choice process.
The system choice then involves selecting t and the associated ¿ to maximize (6), with T
viewed as parametric. The goal is thus to minimize yÁ(t)+®t, and the ¯rst-order condition is
yÁ0(t)+® = 0: (10)
Using Á00 > 0 and ® < 1, the t value that solves (10) is larger than the value that solves (9).
Thus, the transport subsidy ine±ciently biases system choice toward transport systems with
high money cost and low time cost. This conclusion is natural since, by sheltering consumers
from the full money cost of travel, the subsidy encourages a higher t in pursuit of a lower
time cost. Concretely, this result means that a transport subsidy ine±ciently biases choice
away from low-t/high-¿ public-transit systems toward high-t/low-¿ highway networks. This
14conclusion could be used to buttress allegations that U.S. cities have overinvested in freeways
at the expense of public transit.
It remains to consider how the addition of a system choice a®ects the results of section 2.
The answer is that the results are unchanged. To see this conclusion, note that with t now a
























Since yÁ0+® equals zero by (10) and since the second part of the term multiplying G1 vanishes
when ® = 1, the right hand side of (11) once again has the negative sign of G1e x + G2 when
evaluated at ® = 1. Thus, system choice leaves Proposition 1 unchanged, leading to the
following conclusion:7
Proposition 2. Suppose that all transport systems exhibit constant returns to scale,
and that the city residents choose their system in myopic fashion, ignoring the e®ect
on their general tax burden. Then, the conclusions of Proposition 1 continue to hold.
In addition, the transport subsidy ine±ciently biases system choice toward transport
systems with high money cost and low time cost.
3.2. System choice in a city with two income groups
It is sometimes argued that urban sprawl is encouraged by a transport-system choice
made in the interests of high-income suburban residents. Investment in freeways, intended to
facilitate commuting from the suburbs, combined with a corresponding deemphasis of public
transit, is thought to spur excessive spatial of growth of cities. The purpose of the analysis
in this section is to appraise this argument. Since the transport subsidy plays no role in the
argument, it is eliminated from the model by setting ® = 1 and T = 0.
The model now contains two income groups with di®erent time costs, but the assumption
that the city has a single type of transport system is retained. The groups thus disagree over
the characteristics of the preferred transport system, and this disagreement is a key element
in the analysis.8
To make any headway in analyzing the two-group case, a further simplifying assumption is
necessary. In particular, both groups are assumed to have identical Leontief preferences, with
15v(c; q) = minfc; qg. This assumption means that land consumption q is uniform (though en-
dogenous) across locations for each income group, but di®erent between groups, which greatly
simpli¯es the analysis.
Group 0 represents the poor and group 1 the rich, with full incomes denoted y0 and y1.
These two incomes generate di®erent time costs, ¿0 = y0Á(t) and ¿1 = y1Á(t), with ¿0 < ¿1.
The populations of the groups are n0 and n1.
Because of right-angled indi®erence curves, c = q will hold for both groups, so that utility
can be measured directly by q. In addition, using this equality to eliminate ci, the budget
constraint for group i can be written qi + riqi = yi ¡ (¿i + t)x, for i = 0; 1. Note that both
groups face the same money cost parameter t, and that ri is the land rent paid by group i.





Each income group lives where it o®ers the highestbid for land, and these locations depend
on the steepness of the two land-rent curves. If the poor curve is steeper, the poor live near
center (where their bid is higher), with rich living in the suburbs, and the reverse location
pattern holds if the rich curve is steeper. The slope of group i's rent curve is ¡(¿i + t)=qi,
which depends on the endogenous qi. It is assumed, however, that parameter values in the
model are such that the poor curve is steeper, which requires that the poor's lower land
consumption o®sets their smaller time cost, leading to a higher absolute value for the above
slope expression. This assumption yields a realistic central location for the poor group.
Because land consumption isconstantwithin each group, the total amount of land occupied
by a group just equals itspopulation timesthe relevant q value. Recalling thatthe city has unit
width, the poor thus live between the CBD and b x ´ n0q0, while the rich live between b x and
x ´ n0q0+n1q1. The equilibrium conditions for the city require that urban land rent equals ra
at this x value and that the poor and rich land rent functions intersect at b x. Assuming ra = 0
for simplicity and using (12), these conditions are









Equations (13) and (14) determine the equilibrium values of q0 and q1. Letting zi ´ ¿i +t














Since utility is measured by q (or c) consumption, consumer welfare in the city can be written
n0q0 + n1q1. Since utility can also be measured in units of consumption of the numeraire
good c, it follows that, under a Benthamite social welfare function, total welfare for both city
residents and absentee landowners is just total c consumption in the city plus total land rent.
It can be shown that the relevant social welfare expression is simply a function of the consumer
welfare measure, n0q0 + n1q1. Using (15) and (16), the latter measure equals









Using these solutions, two questions can be addressed. First, is the spatial size of the city
ine±ciently large if the transport system is chosen in the interests of the rich group? In other
words, does rich control of the transport-system choice create urban sprawl? Second, how do
the transports systems favored by the rich and poor di®er? Which has the lower time cost?
The answer to the ¯rst question is almost immediate. The key observation is that the
welfare measure n0q0 +n1q1, which equals total land consumption in the city, is just equal to
x. Thus, the welfare-maximizing transport system leads to the largest possible spatial size for
the city, as in the one-group model discussed above (where satisfaction of (9) maximizes x).
System choice according toany other criterion leads to a smaller city. One such criterion would
be maximizing of the welfare of the rich group, which requires choosing the transport-system
to maximize q1. The result of such a choice would be a smaller-than-optimal city size.
17This conclusion shows that, rather than leading to sprawl, rich control of transport-system
choice ine±ciently limits the spatial size of the city. The intuitive reason is that, while the
rich group's choice maximizes their own land consumption, and hence leads to a maximal
spatial size for the city's rich zone, the transport system chosen by the rich is wrong from
the perspective of the poor. This discrepancy reduces the poor group's land consumption,
depressing the city's overall spatial size despite the enlargement of the rich area. While this
result is intimately tied to the Leontief speci¯cation, the conclusion would also hold by a
continuity argument when substitution between land and c is nonzero but su±ciently small.
To compare the optimal tvalues forthe twogroups, answeringthe second question, consider
the solutions in (15) and (17). First, maximizing q0 requires choosingt tominimize n0z0+n1z1,
or equivalently to minimize the population-weighted average z ´ ¯z0 + (1 ¡ ¯)z1, where
¯ = n0=(n0 +n1) is the poor population share. With z = (¯y0+(1¡¯)y1)Á(t)+t ´ yÁ(t)+t,
where y is average income, the ¯rst-order condition is yÁ0(t)+ 1 = 0. By contrast, inspection
of (17) shows that maximizing this expression requires minimizing an appropriately weighted
average of z1 = y1Á(t)+t and z. But since @z1=@t = y1Á0+1 < @z=@t given y1 > y and Á0 < 0,
it follows that @z=@t = yÁ0(t) + 1 > 0 must hold at the solution (where a weighted average
of the z1 and z derivatives equals zero). As a result, the t value that maximizes n0q0 + n1q1
is larger than the value that maximizes q0. It then follows that the t value that maximizes q1
exceeds both these values.9
Thus, the rich group's preferred transportsystem has a higher money cost and a lower time
cost (a lower µ) than the preferred system of the poor. This result is natural given that a high
full income raises the loss from time spent in commuting, heightening the rich group'sincentive
to increase (via a higher money cost) the travel speed o®ered by the transport system. Because
of its lower full income, the poor group places less value on an increase in speed, making a
lower t and higher µ optimal. Note that the t and µ values preferred by the two groups bracket
the socially optimal values, which represent a compromise. Summarizing yields
Proposition 3. Suppose that consumers have Leontief preferences and that the poor
group lives in the central part of the city. Then, if the rich group controls the city's
transport-system choice, it chooses a system with a higher money cost and higher travel
18speed than the socially optimal system. Since this choice leads to a smaller-than-optimal
spatial size for the city, rich control of system choice does not contribute to urban
sprawl.
Future work could extend the framework analyzed in this section in a number of fruitful
directions. First, the transport subsidy, which wasexcluded from the analysis, could be reintro-
duced. The subsidy could be supported by an income tax rather than a head tax, realistically
generating di®erent general tax burdens for the rich and poor. Analysis of system choice un-
der such a subsidy regime might yield additional insights, although preliminary work suggests
that even solving for the Leontief equilibrium with t held ¯xed is di±cult. Another extension
would allow the city to construct two transport systems with di®erent values of t and ¿, with
each system designed to serve a particular income group. Again, the required analysis would
be complex. It is interesting to note that, if the transport systems in such a setup exhibited
increasing rather than constant returns to scale, the optimum might involve construction of
a single, compromise system that exploits scale economies, despite the possibility of tailoring
separate systems to the needs of the di®erent income groups.
4. Conclusion
This paperhas shown that transport subsidies may contribute to undesirable urban sprawl,
while biasing system choice toward freeways and away from public transit. It is important to
recognize, however, that the paper's argument linking subsidies to the overexpansion of cities
is correct only if transport systems exhibit constant returns to scale. In this case, subsidies
and their attendant e®ects, including city expansion, are ine±cient. By contrast, if transport
systems exhibitincreasing returns, then subsidies are desirable, and their spatial e®ects cannot
be criticized. While evidence pointsto increasing returns in transportation, a counterargument
says that, when properly measured, returns to scale should be constant. This conclusion
suggests that, despite the countervailing empirical evidence, there may be reason to include
transportation subsidies among the culprits causing ine±cient spatial expansion of cities.
Sprawl critics frequently point to compact European cities as the preferred alternative to
U.S.-style sprawl. This compactness is due in part to the Europe's lower reliance on transport
subsidies, with fares covering a greater share of public-transit costs and user fees exceeding the
19cost of road provision. If the constant returns assumption is valid, making subsidies ine±cient,
then Europe's lower subsidies may well be desirable, and the resulting compactness of its cities
may represent a socially preferable urban form.
20Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Recall from (7) that x = G(y ¡T; ¿ +®t). The proof shows that
G1e x + G2 < 0 holds at ® = 1, or G2 < ¡G1e x. The ¯rst step is to totally di®erentiate (1) and
(2) to determine G1 and G2. Since all derivatives are evaluated at ® = 1, the arguments of
the r and q functions in (1) and (2) are simply y and z = ¿ + t. Let the r and q derivatives
with respect to these arguments be denoted ry;rz; qy and qz.
Letting a bar over r or q indicate that the variable is evaluated at x, total di®erentiation







































q2dx < 0: (a3)
Since it is easily seen from di®erentiating the consumer equilibrium conditions that rz = ¡xry










































= ¡xG1 < ¡e xG1; (a6)
establishing the desired inequality. The second inequality in (a6) uses G1 > 0 and x > e x.
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22Footnotes
¤I have bene¯ted from helpful comments from Marvin Kraus, Kangoh Lee, Dan McMillen,
David Pines, Ken Small, Cli®ord Winston and a number of seminar participants. Any
shortcomings in the paper, however, are my responsibility.
1See Brueckner and Kim (2003) fora discussion of the e®ectof the property tax and Voith and
Gyourko (2002) for a discussion of the tax subsidy to homeownership. The three remaining
distortions are discussed by Brueckner (2000, 2001). For additional overviews of the sprawl
issue, see Glaeser and Kahn (2003) and Nechyba and Walsh (2003).
2See the APTA web site at <http://www.apta.com/research/stats/overview/natsum.cfm>.
3See the FHWA website at <http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/hs01/hf10.htm>. It should be
noted that this 60% ¯gure somewhat understates the magnitude of user fees, given that a
portion the resulting revenue is devoted to non-highway uses, such as mass transit.
4This dominance would be strengthened in the case of a favored city within a federal system.
In this situation, funds supplied to the city by the federal government would partly cover the
local transport subsidy, so that the local head tax T could be lower than the value implied
by (3). As a result, x would be even larger than in a balanced-budget setting.
5If subsidies are ine±cient, the question then arises as to why they exist. One answer is that
subsidies may bene¯t urban residents (with @u=@® > 0 holding) even though they reduce
overall welfare. Alternatively, in a more complete model, subsidies could be the result of
lobbying by narrower interest groups, such as road builders or transport unions.
6The analysis will assume a uniform subsidy parameter ® even though the evidence presented
in the introduction shows that subsidies may di®er across modes.
7It can be shown that Proposition 2 holds without the myopia assumption under particular
parameterizations of the model. For example, under the Leontief preferences considered
in the next section, Proposition 2 holds even when consumers understand the connection
between T and ®.
8For an early analysis of a city with multiple income groups, see Hartwick, Schweizer and
Varaiya (1976).
239Note that, from the perspective of the poor, the optimal transport system re°ects the city's
average income, satisfying (9) with y = y. The optimality condition forthe rich incorporates
a larger income value, although one di®erent from y1.
10When y increases with utility held constant, which increases the vertical intercept of the
budget line, the line itself must rotate clockwise to preserve the indi®erence curve tangency,
raising c and reducing q (yielding qy < 0). When u rises, r must fall to allow the consumer
to reach the higher indi®erence curve, yielding ru < 0.
24 
CESifo Working Paper Series 




1023 Patrick Karl O’Brien, The Governance of Globalization: The Political Economy of 
Anglo-American Hegemony, 1793-2003, September 2003 
 
1024 Antonio Ciccone and Giovanni Peri, Skills’ Substitutability and Technological Progress: 
U.S. States 1950-1990, September 2003 
 
1025 Bjørn Sandvik, Optimal Taxation and Normalisations, September 2003 
 
1026 Massimo Bordignon and Gilberto Turati, Bailing Out Expectations and Health 
Expenditure in Italy, September 2003 
 
1027 José A. Herce, Namkee Ahn, Ricard Génova, and Joaquín Pereira, Bio-Demographic 
and Health Aspects of Ageing in the EU, September 2003 
 
1028 John Komlos and Marieluise Baur, From the Tallest to (One of) the Fattest: The 
Enigmatic Fate of the American Population in the 20
th Century, September 2003 
 
1029 Stefan Napel and Mika Widgrén, Bargaining and Distribution of Power in the EU’s 
Conciliation Committee, September 2003 
 
1030 Kai Li and Dale J. Poirier, Relationship Between Maternal Behavior During Pregnancy, 
Birth Outcome, and Early Childhood Development: An Exploratory Study, September 
2003 
 
1031 Ivar Ekeland, James J. Heckman, and Lars Nesheim, Identifcation and Estimation of 
Hedonic Models, September 2003 
 
1032 Kjetil Bjorvatn and Alexander W. Cappelen, Decentralization and the Fate of 
Minorities, September 2003 
 
1033 Lars-Erik Borge and Jørn Rattsø, The Relationships Between Costs and User Charges: 
The Case of a Norwegian Utility Service, September 2003 
 
1034 Maureen Were and Nancy N. Nafula, An Assessment of the Impact of HIV/AIDS on 
Economic Growth: The Case of Kenya, September 2003 
 
1035 A. Lans Bovenberg, Tax Policy and Labor Market Performance, September 2003 
 
1036 Peter Birch Sørensen, Neutral Taxation of Shareholder Income: A Norwegian Tax 
Reform Proposal, September 2003 
 
1037 Roberta Dessi and Sheilagh Ogilvie, Social Capital and Collusion: The Case of 
Merchant Guilds, September 2003 
 1038 Alessandra Casarico and Carlo Devillanova, Capital-skill Complementarity and the 
Redistributive Effects of Social Security Reform, September 2003 
 
1039 Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka, Privatizing Social Security Under Balanced-Budget   
Constraints: A Political-Economy Approach, September 2003 
 
1040 Michele Moretto, Paolo M. Panteghini, and Carlo Scarpa, Investment Size and Firm’s 
Value under Profit Sharing Regulation, September 2003 
 
1041 A. Lans Bovenberg and Peter Birch Sørensen, Improving the Equity-Efficiency Trade-
off: Mandatory Savings Accounts for Social Insurance, September 2003 
 
1042 Bas van Aarle, Harry Garretsen, and Florence Huart, Transatlantic Monetary and Fiscal 
Policy Interaction, September 2003 
 
1043 Jerome L. Stein, Stochastic Optimal Control Modeling of Debt Crises, September 2003 
 
1044 Thomas Stratmann, Tainted Money? Contribution Limits and the Effectiveness of 
Campaign Spending, September 2003 
 
1045 Marianna Grimaldi and Paul De Grauwe, Bubbling and Crashing Exchange Rates, 
September 2003 
 
1046 Assar Lindbeck and Dennis J. Snower, The Firm as a Pool of Factor Complementarities, 
September 2003 
 
1047 Volker Grossmann, Firm Size and Diversification: Asymmetric Multiproduct Firms 
under Cournot Competition, September 2003 
 
1048 Dan Anderberg, Insiders, Outsiders, and the Underground Economy, October 2003 
 
1049 Jose Apesteguia, Steffen Huck and Jörg Oechssler, Imitation – Theory and 
Experimental Evidence, October 2003 
 
1050 G. Abío, G. Mahieu and  C. Patxot, On the Optimality of PAYG Pension Systems in an 
Endogenous Fertility Setting, October 2003 
 
1051 Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro, Output Smoothing in EMU and OECD: Can We Forego 
Government Contribution? A Risk Sharing Approach, October 2003 
 
1052 Olivier Bargain and Nicolas Moreau, Is the Collective Model of Labor Supply Useful 
for Tax Policy Analysis? A Simulation Exercise, October 2003 
 
1053 Michael Artis, Is there a European Business Cycle?, October 2003 
 
1054 Martin R. West and Ludger Wößmann, Which School Systems Sort Weaker Students 
into Smaller Classes? International Evidence, October 2003 
 
1055 Annette Alstadsaeter, Income Tax, Consumption Value of Education, and the Choice of 
Educational Type, October 2003 
 1056 Ansgar Belke and Ralph Setzer, Exchange Rate Volatility and Employment Growth: 
Empirical Evidence from the CEE Economies, October 2003 
 
1057 Carsten Hefeker, Structural Reforms and the Enlargement of Monetary Union, October 
2003 
 
1058 Henning Bohn and Charles Stuart, Voting and Nonlinear Taxes in a Stylized 
Representative Democracy, October 2003 
 
1059 Philippe Choné, David le Blanc and Isabelle Robert-Bobée, Female Labor Supply and 
Child Care in France, October 2003 
 
1060 V. Anton Muscatelli, Patrizio Tirelli and Carmine Trecroci, Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
Interactions: Empirical Evidence and Optimal  Policy Using a Structural New 
Keynesian Model, October 2003 
 
1061 Helmuth Cremer and Pierre Pestieau, Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Survey, October 
2003 
 
1062 Henning Bohn, Will Social Security and Medicare Remain Viable as the U.S. 
Population is Aging? An Update, October 2003 
 
1063 James M. Malcomson , Health Service Gatekeepers, October 2003 
 
1064 Jakob von Weizsäcker, The Hayek Pension: An efficient minimum pension to 
complement the welfare state, October 2003 
 
1065 Joerg Baten, Creating Firms for a New Century: Determinants of Firm Creation around 
1900, October 2003 
 
1066 Christian Keuschnigg, Public Policy and Venture Capital Backed Innovation, October 
2003 
 
1067 Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, State Intervention on the Market for Natural Damage 
Insurance in Europe, October 2003 
 
1068 Mark V. Pauly, Time, Risk, Precommitment, and Adverse Selection in Competitive 
Insurance Markets, October 2003 
 
1069 Wolfgang Ochel, Decentralising Wage Bargaining in Germany – A Way to Increase 
Employment?, November 2003 
 
1070 Jay Pil Choi, Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation, 
November 2003 
 
1071 Martin Peitz and Patrick Waelbroeck, Piracy of Digital Products: A Critical Review of 
the Economics Literature, November 2003 
 
1072 George Economides, Jim Malley, Apostolis Philippopoulos, and Ulrich Woitek, 
Electoral Uncertainty, Fiscal Policies & Growth: Theory and Evidence from Germany, 
the UK and the US, November 2003  
1073 Robert S. Chirinko and Julie Ann Elston, Finance, Control, and Profitability: The 
Influence of German Banks, November 2003 
 
1074 Wolfgang Eggert and Martin Kolmar, The Taxation of Financial Capital under 
Asymmetric Information and the Tax-Competition Paradox, November 2003 
 
1075 Amihai Glazer, Vesa Kanniainen, and Panu Poutvaara, Income Taxes, Property Values, 
and Migration, November 2003 
 
1076 Jonas Agell, Why are Small Firms Different? Managers’ Views, November 2003 
 
1077 Rafael Lalive, Social Interactions in Unemployment, November 2003 
 
1078 Jean Pisani-Ferry, The Surprising French Employment Performance: What Lessons?, 
November 2003 
 
1079 Josef Falkinger, Attention, Economies, November 2003 
 
1080 Andreas Haufler and Michael Pflüger, Market Structure and the Taxation of 
International Trade, November 2003 
 
1081 Jonas Agell and Helge Bennmarker, Endogenous Wage Rigidity, November 2003 
 
1082 Fwu-Ranq Chang, On the Elasticities of Harvesting Rules, November 2003 
 
1083 Lars P. Feld and Gebhard Kirchgässner, The Role of Direct Democracy in the European 
Union, November 2003 
 
1084 Helge Berger, Jakob de Haan and Robert Inklaar, Restructuring the ECB, November 
2003 
 
1085 Lorenzo Forni and Raffaela Giordano, Employment in the Public Sector, November 
2003 
 
1086 Ann-Sofie Kolm and Birthe Larsen, Wages, Unemployment, and the Underground 
Economy, November 2003 
 
1087 Lars P. Feld, Gebhard Kirchgässner, and Christoph A. Schaltegger, Decentralized 
Taxation and the Size of Government: Evidence from Swiss State and Local 
Governments, November 2003 
 
1088 Arno Riedl and Frans van Winden, Input Versus Output Taxation in an Experimental 
International Economy, November 2003 
 
1089 Nikolas Müller-Plantenberg, Japan’s Imbalance of Payments, November 2003 
 
1090 Jan K. Brueckner, Transport Subsidies, System Choice, and Urban Sprawl, November 
2003 
 